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INTRODUCTION
Andrew Coan’s new book, Rationing the Constitution: How Judicial
Capacity Shapes Supreme Court Decision-Making, 1 is a rare contribution
to constitutional scholarship. It is primarily descriptive, not normative, and
it offers a new analytical framework focusing on institutional constraints,
not ideology or law. Coan argues that the Court’s doctrinal and analytical
approaches are driven in part by limitations on judicial capacity. Although
he mentions the federal judicial system as a whole, Coan’s primary focus
is on the Supreme Court itself. 2
Coan’s empirical analysis is persuasive. 3 It seems undeniable that his
Judicial Capacity Model (JCM) helps to explain the approaches that the
Supreme Court takes in some areas of constitutional law, approaches that
he describes as a form of “rationing.” 4 He describes, for example, how the
*
Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Institute on the Supreme Court
of the United States (ISCOTUS), IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. Thanks are due to the
participants in the Symposium at the University of Wisconsin at which I presented an
earlier draft of this article, to Andrew Nishioka for excellent research assistance, and to
Mandy Lee and Jean Wenger for their invaluable library support.
1.
ANDREW COAN, RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION: HOW JUDICIAL CAPACITY
SHAPES SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING (2019).
2.
Id. at 4, 13. Coan explains that because there is “just one court at the apex of
the system, . . . [t]he capacity of the system as a whole is constrained by the capacity of the
single court that sits at its top.” Id. In part, Coan explains, this constraint arises from the
Court’s longstanding norms, including commitments both to uniformity in the application
and interpretation of federal law and “to review[ing] nearly every invalidation of a federal
statute.” Id. at 15.
3.
See id. at 51–162.
4.
Id. at 4.
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Court’s deference to other government actors in some doctrinal areas
discourages litigation and thereby reduces caseloads, 5 and how its
preference for “clear categorical rules” in certain areas of law “reduces
uncertainty and thereby encourages greater voluntary compliance and
settlement outside of court.” 6 And he persuasively identifies the types of
subjects most susceptible to rationing—“high-stakes domains,” in which
the Court will not tolerate disuniformity, and “high-volume domains,”
which have the potential to generate more litigation than the Court can
handle. 7
In this Essay, I build on and complicate Coan’s account. Coan begins
his analysis with the New Deal (although he also acknowledges the
significance of 1925, a key year for changes in the Court’s jurisdiction, as
I will discuss). 8 Here, I offer a deeper historical understanding of why and
how the Court has attempted to manage its caseload, including when it has
successfully appealed to Congress to address its concerns. This historical
discussion, with its emphasis on the congressional role, suggests a
normative critique of the Court’s use of JCM, at least in those few areas
of law, such as constitutional challenges to congressional and legislative
districts, in which Congress has maintained the Court’s mandatory
appellate jurisdiction. More specifically, I argue that the Court’s recent
decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, Inc., 9 holding partisan
gerrymandering nonjusticiable, was wrongly decided in part because in
that case, the Court flouted an explicit and carefully considered
congressional determination about the Supreme Court’s mandatory
jurisdiction.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the history of Supreme
Court caseloads and how the Court and Congress alike have responded
when the Court’s caseloads have become too burdensome. Part II turns
first to the recent partisan gerrymandering cases, noting the caseloadrelated concerns articulated by some Justices during the oral argument.
This Part then charts the history of Congress’s decision to maintain the
Court’s mandatory jurisdiction in constitutional challenges to redistricting
and argues that this history renders caseload considerations inappropriate
in the partisan gerrymandering cases. Finally, Part III returns to Coan’s
book, discussing his understanding of judicial independence and arguing
that it is both underinclusive and impossible to evaluate without a
normative frame.

5.
Id. at 3.
6.
Id. at 23 (emphasis omitted). See also id. at 165–66 (detailing both
mechanisms).
7.
Id. at 25–30.
8.
Id. at 37.
9.
139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
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I. THE SUPREME COURT’S LONG STRUGGLE TO CONTROL ITS DOCKET
The Judiciary Act of 1789 was the first bill introduced in the Senate
in the first Congress. 10 The Act provided for a Supreme Court of six
justices. It also established district courts and circuit courts, but those
courts operated differently from the courts with those names today.
Notably, both sets of courts had primarily original, not appellate,
jurisdiction, with each responsible for different types of cases. 11 Most
appeals went directly to the Supreme Court, which had no choice but to
hear them. 12
Such mandatory appellate jurisdiction was likely a default rather than
a carefully evaluated decision. The form of appeal Congress adopted, a
writ of error, “was deeply rooted in the English common law
jurisprudence.” 13 At the time, there was no particular reason to consider a
different mechanism. 14
At first, the system worked well. Between 1790 and 1795, the Court
considered only about twenty-five cases. 15 But caseloads expanded with
the country. By 1850, the Court had 253 cases pending, and by 1890, there
were 1,816 pending cases. 16 Cases took three years to be heard. 17
The Court’s response to this flood of litigation is consistent with
Coan’s argument that caseload pressures influence how the Court decides
10.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, (1789); Charles Warren, New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 49 (1923);
Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory
Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81, 81 (1989).
11.
FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 11–13 (1927). Some district court
cases were appealed to the circuit courts. Id. at 12 (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§
21–22, 1 Stat. 73, 83–84 (1789)).
12.
The Judiciary Act did not provide for appellate jurisdiction over every case,
but in cases where it did, the Court had to decide the appeals absent a jurisdictional defect.
Boskey & Gressman, supra note 10, at 82.
13.
Id.
14.
John M. Simpson, Turning Over the Reins: The Abolition of the Mandatory
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 297, 302–03 (1978)
(describing this history).
15.
Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging
Versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH & LEE L. REV. 271, 275–76
(2006) [hereinafter Shapiro, Olympian Court] (citing ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M.
MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTICAL STUDIES ON THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 137 tbl.9 (1978) (listing the number of opinions per Court
term)).
16.
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 11, at 60; see also Shapiro, Olympian
Court, supra note 15, at 275–76 (describing this history); Carolyn Shapiro, A “Progressive
Contraction of Jurisdiction”: The Making of the Modern Supreme Court, in THEN & NOW:
STORIES OF LAW AND PROGRESS 80 (Lori Andrews & Sarah Harding eds., 2013) [hereinafter
Shapiro, Progressive Contraction] (same).
17.
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 11, at 257.
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cases. 18 Similar to the deference that he describes the Court offering the
executive branch as a way to stem a tide of cases it would otherwise feel
obligated to hear, 19 the nineteenth century Court explicitly adopted
deferential standards of review of lower court decisions. In 1865, for
example, it affirmed a lower court judgment due to “ample testimony to
support the decision” 20—a standard that echoes today’s “substantial
evidence” or “clear error” standards for agency or lower-court
factfinding. 21 And it explicitly warned that “in such cases, parties should
not appeal to this court with any expectation that we will reverse the
decision of the courts below.” 22
But the Justices did not rely solely on such jurisprudential techniques
to manage their caseload. They also wanted Congress to act. By the late
1880s, the Justices were speaking out “to enlist public opinion to secure
[c]ongressional action.” 23 In 1891, Congress passed the Evarts Act, 24
which gave the Supreme Court discretion over whether to hear appeals in
certain types of cases through the writ of certiorari. 25 There was an
immediate, “decisive” reduction in the Court’s caseload. 26
The Evarts Act did not extend discretionary jurisdiction to most
cases, however, and the Supreme Court’s caseload swelled again. Between
1891 and 1920, Congress repeatedly eliminated the Court’s mandatory
jurisdiction over cases deemed unlikely to present issues of national
significance. 27 And in 1925, Congress dramatically expanded the Court’s
18.
See generally COAN, supra note 1.
19.
Id. at 91–99. The parallels are apparent, but the situations are not identical.
Coan describes a Court that today feels obligated to hear certain types of cases, such as
cases that strike down a federal law, but that obligation arises primarily from judicial
norms, not from statutory mandate. Id.
20.
Newell v. Norton, 70 U.S. (1 Wall.) 257, 267 (1865).
21.
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (explaining substantial
evidence standard); Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2565 (2019)
(applying clearly erroneous standard); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (articulating clearly
erroneous standard).
22.
Newell, 70 U.S. at 267–68.
23.
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 11, at 97 (citations omitted).
24.
Evarts Act (Circuit Court of Appeals Act), ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). The
statute was also known as the Circuit Court of Appeals Act. Id. Congress had been
considering reforms to the judicial system, including to the Supreme Court, since after the
Civil War. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 11, at 60–97.
25.
Evarts Act (Circuit Court of Appeals Act), ch. 517, §§ 6–7, 26 Stat. 826,
827–28 (1891). See also Shapiro, Olympian Court, supra note 15, at 276 n.11 (discussing
Evarts Act). The Evarts Act also created intermediate federal appeals courts, hoping that a
mandatory appeal at the intermediate level would make parties less likely to go to the
Supreme Court. See id.; Shapiro, Progressive Contraction, supra note 16, at 83.
26.
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 11, at 102.
27.
See id. at 103–45, 187–216. One of these measures, for example, a restriction
on mandatory jurisdiction in cases arising under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, “is
generally attributed to Mr. Justice McReynolds . . . .” Id. at 214.
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discretionary certiorari jurisdiction in the Judges Act, so-called because it
was strongly promoted by the Justices themselves. 28 In other words, when
faced with jurisdictional requirements that led to an unmanageable
caseload, the Court repeatedly asked Congress for help.
The same pattern recurred in the 1970s and 1980s. By the early 1970s,
the Court was issuing about 150 plenary decisions a year. 29 That number
held steady: between 1971 and 1988, not including summary affirmances,
the Court heard and decided an average of 147 cases a year. 30 This
caseload was seen as unmanageable by the Justices and courtwatchers
alike, and it became a subject of public focus. 31 Again, the Court used the
tools it had at its own disposal to manage its caseload. For example, the
Court regularly summarily affirmed cases that came to it under its
mandatory jurisdiction. 32 Summary affirmances required no oral argument
and no briefing beyond the initial papers—and they also required no
opinions by the Justices. 33
And Congress also took action again, significantly reducing the
Court’s mandatory jurisdiction. One source of mandatory appeals had
been created with the 1903 Expediting Act. 34 Under that law, certain types
of cases were heard first by a three-judge district court and then were
appealed directly to the Supreme Court as of right. Over time, Congress
had subjected more types of cases to this procedure. 35 In the 1970s,
Congress reversed course and eliminated the three-judge district
court/mandatory appeal mechanism for a variety of different types of
cases, including most cases seeking injunctive relief against the
enforcement of state or federal statutes. 36 And in 1988, again at the Court’s

28.
Boskey & Gressman, supra note 10, at 85–86.
29.
Arthur D. Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary
Act of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970’s, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1728 (1978).
30.
Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP.
CT. REV. 403, 403 & n.3. The Court was also receiving more than 4,000 petitions for
certiorari annually, along with about 1,000 other case filings. See Boskey & Gressman,
supra note 10, at 87.
31.
See Shapiro, Olympian Court, supra note 15, at 276–77 (citations omitted);
Simpson, supra note 14, at 298–99 n.7 (detailing public discussion of and attention to the
problem of the Supreme Court’s caseload).
32.
Boskey & Gressman, supra note 10, at 92.
33.
These summary affirmances created their own problems, notably by raising
questions about their precedential authority in the absence of the Court’s full deliberation.
Boskey & Gressman, supra note 10, at 92–93.
34.
Expediting Act (Trusts and Interstate Commerce), ch. 544, 32 Stat. 823
(1903).
35.
See Expediting Act (Trusts and Interstate Commerce), ch. 544, § 1, 32 Stat.
823 (1903); Boskey & Gressman, supra note 10, at 89 (discussing such statutes).
36.
Boskey & Gressman, supra note 10, at 89–90 (listing statutes).
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urging, Congress eliminated the mechanism for almost (but not quite) all
of the remaining cases to which it applied. 37
Today, in contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, caseloads are at a historic
low. The Court issued merits opinions in seventy-two argued cases last
Term. 38 Indeed, some complain that the Court today does not decide
enough cases, and argue that the Justices would write fewer separate
opinions and there would be fewer fractured holdings if the Court decided
more cases. 39 Coan himself would say that the Court’s current caseload is
nowhere near capacity, which he estimates at 150–200 cases a year. 40
None of this discussion refutes Coan’s argument, but it does
complicate it and raise some questions. Are there differences, for example,
in the Court’s use of the caseload management techniques Coan has
identified pre- and post-1988? 41 Of course, even if such differences do not
exist, JCM could still carry explanatory power. If caseload concerns in the
past drove doctrine, there could now be principles, precedents, norms, or
habits of mind that still influence the Court. 42 Coan also suggests that even
in the absence of immediate caseload pressures, the Court could be wary
of opening the floodgates. 43 But the story is complicated by these
historically low caseloads.
II. MANDATORY JURISDICTION AND PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
This history of congressional attention to the Court’s caseload
concerns raises a normative point. That is, if the Court has concerns about
its caseload, perhaps it should appeal to Congress, instead of manipulating
doctrine. 44 But in those few arenas in where Congress has maintained
37.
Id. at 91–93 (quoting Justices’ letters to Congress in 1982 and 1987); Act of
June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988).
38.
Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 28, 2019),
https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/StatPack_OT18-7_30_19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F63H-VMAM]. This number counts consolidated cases as a single case.
Id.
39.
See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme Court’s Caseload: A
Question of Law or Politics?, 119 YALE L. J. ONLINE 99, 101 (2010); Shapiro, Olympian
Court, supra note 15, at 294–95 & nn. 92–95.
40.
COAN, supra note 1, at 15.
41.
My unproven hypothesis is that there may be differences, most notably in
the increase in what Sunstein calls minimalist judging. See generally Cass. R. Sustein,
Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825 (2008). Minimalist judging can be
costly in terms of capacity because litigants have to keep coming back if there is not clarity
about what the law is. See David S. Schwartz, Judicial Capacity, Causation, and History:
Next Steps for the Judicial Capacity Model, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 195.
42.
See COAN, supra note 1, at 34–35.
43.
See id. at 15–16. Coan also notes that he “does not assume that the influence
of judicial capacity on Supreme Court decision-making is necessarily conscious.” Id. at 34.
44.
Neil Siegel made a similar point in his remarks at the symposium. Neil
Seigel, Remark at the University of Wisconsin Law Review Symposium: Rationing the
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mandatory jurisdiction, the Court should respect that legislative choice—
something it failed to do in Rucho.
A. Caseload Concerns in the Gerrymandering Cases
In the recent partisan gerrymandering cases, Justices and advocates
explicitly discussed caseload concerns. At oral argument in Gill v.
Whitford, 45 the gerrymandering case argued the Term before the Court
decided Rucho, the Chief Justice expressed his concern about how partisan
gerrymandering claims would affect the Court’s caseload:
[I]f the claim is allowed to proceed, there will naturally be a lot
of these claims raised around the country. Politics is a very
important driving force and those claims will be raised. And
every one of them will come here for a decision on the merits.
These cases are not within our discretionary jurisdiction.
They’re the mandatory jurisdiction. 46
The following Term, in Rucho, Paul Clement, arguing against
justiciability, reiterated and emphasized this concern. “[I]f you get in the
business of adjudicating these cases, these cases will come, they will come
in large numbers, and they will come on your mandatory appellate
jurisdiction.” 47 Justice Gorsuch picked up on this theme when questioning
the plaintiffs’ lawyer. “[W]e’re going to have to, as part of our mandatory
jurisdiction, in every single redistricting case, look at the evidence to see
why there was a deviation from the norm of proportional representation.
That’s -- that’s -- that’s the ask?” 48
Roberts and Clement also expressly tied these concerns to the Court’s
judicial independence, more specifically the fear of the Court appearing
unduly political. Roberts laid out this concern explicitly in Gill:
We will have to decide in every case whether the Democrats win
or the Republicans win. So it’s going to be a problem here across
the board. And if you’re the intelligent man on the street and the
Court issues a decision, and let’s say the Democrats win, and
that person will say: Well, why did the Democrats win? . . . It
Constitution: How Judicial Capacity Shapes Supreme Decision-Making (Oct. 24–25,
2019).
45.
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). The Court did not decide Gill on the merits, instead
holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Id. at 1929-33.
46.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 36–37, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2017) (No. 16-1161).
47.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct.
2484 (2019) (No. 18-422).
48.
Id. at 46 (No. 18-422).
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must be because the Supreme Court preferred the Democrats
over the Republicans. And that’s going to come out one case
after another as these cases are brought in every state. And that
is going to cause very serious harm to the status and integrity of
the decisions of this Court in the eyes of the country. 49

Clement drove the point home in his oral argument in Rucho: “And
once you get into the political thicket, you will not get out and you will
tarnish the image of this Court for the other cases where it needs that
reputation for independence so people can understand the fundamental
difference between judging and all other politics.” 50
This candor at oral argument did not find its way into the Rucho and
Gill decisions. And with good reason. While the political question doctrine
requires an examination of whether the issue has a “judicially manageable
standard,” that manageability analysis goes to logic, evidence, and
predictability, not to caseloads and not to fears of public reaction to
hypothetical future decisions. 51
Nonetheless, the partisan gerrymandering cases fit very neatly within
Coan’s analysis. They are certainly “high-stakes,” 52 and given both the
existence of mandatory jurisdiction and the cyclical nature of redistricting,
they could be seen as “high-volume” at least from the Court’s
perspective. 53 In this regard, Rucho could be seen as the judicial capacity
model taken to an extreme. Rather than articulating legal standards that

49.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 37–38, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2017) (No. 16-1161).
50.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct.
2484 (2019) (No. 18-422). The “political thicket” was how Justice Frankfurter referred to
litigation over reapportionment in his 1946 opinion announcing the Court’s holding that
Guarantee Clause claims are nonjusticiable. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
51.
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291
(2004)).
52.
COAN, supra note 1, at 23. On the other hand, gerrymandering cases are not
clearly as high-stakes as Coan defines it — likely to produce disuniformity or striking down
federal laws. Id. at 29. Nonetheless, I think it is fair to say that even in the absence of
mandatory jurisdiction, the Court would be likely to give plenary review to many, if not
most, cases striking down legislative and congressional maps, out of federalism concerns
if nothing else. Coan explains that the Court has to manage its caseload like a household
manages its budget. Id. at 20–23. Thus, although it might be able to decide the
gerrymandering cases, it might have to sacrifice its norms in other arenas. Id.; see also id.
at 29 (explaining that in a high-stakes area of law, “even a decision that invites much less
aggregate litigation is going to very quickly produce a significant demand on the Supreme
Court”). In fact, partisan gerrymandering cases might be the unusual arena in which the
aggregate amount of litigation has a remarkably disproportionate effect on the Supreme
Court’s own caseload. See id.
53.
On the other hand, unlike many of the capacity-constrained arenas that Coan
discusses, see, e.g., id. at 172 (discussing the nondelegation doctrine); id. at 188 (discussing
equal protection), the potential number of cases has a clear cap.
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reduce or discourage litigation, the Court declared the federal judiciary
simply unable to decide these cases. 54
But if Coan is right that the Court sometimes manipulates doctrine to
manage its docket, Rucho is a prime example of when doing so is
particularly inappropriate. The erasure of the congressional role in both
Coan’s book and in the Court’s partisan gerrymandering decisions masks
an important normative critique of the Court’s decision in Rucho. Not only
is it doctrinally incoherent to import mandatory jurisdiction into the
political question analysis, but it is exactly backwards. Congress chose to
retain the three-judge panel and mandatory appeal procedure for
constitutional challenges to congressional and legislative districts, even as
it eliminated that mechanism in almost every other context. Examining
that history demonstrates just how inappropriate the Rucho holding was.
B. Mandatory Jurisdiction to Ensure Constitutional Districting
As already explained, the three-judge district court, with direct
mandatory appeal to the Supreme Court, was created in its basic form in
1903. 55 Initially, this mechanism was limited to civil antitrust cases
brought by the attorney general. 56 Over time, however, even as Congress
cut back on the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction over some types of cases,
it expanded the use of the three-judge court with direct appeal for others.
In 1910, Congress provided that “federal interlocutory injunctions against
unconstitutional state statutes” could be issued only by a three-judge
district court, 57 and in 1925 and 1948, it extended that mechanism to

54.
One could imagine, instead, that the Court announced a constitutional
standard for evaluating partisan gerrymandering that is relatively deferential to state mapdrawers perhaps by imposing a clear, categorical rule that most redistricting maps could
meet. See id. at 168–71. Many opponents of partisan gerrymandering might have
considered such a standard inadequate. Cf. id. at 178. But it might have been significantly
preferable to Rucho’s outright abdication. In Coan’s terms, finding partisan
gerrymandering cases nonjusticiable might be, not a “second-best” outcome, but much
lower on the list. Cf. id. at 168–71. But see id. at 187 (suggesting that under some
circumstances, “crude categorical rules” are “worse than no judicial review at all”).
55.
Expediting Act (Trusts and Interstate Commerce), ch. 544, § 1, 32 Stat. 823
(1903).
56.
Id.; Boskey & Gressman, supra note 10, at 84.
57.
David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional
Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 & n.35 (1964) (citing Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, §
17, 36 Stat. 557).
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permanent injunctions against state statutes. 58 It did the same for cases
seeking to enjoin federal statutes in 1937. 59
The basic arguments in favor of this mechanism in cases seeking to
enjoin statutes were both technical and political. As a technical matter,
injunctions of duly enacted laws, whether federal or state, were disruptive,
and a direct and mandatory appeal to the Supreme Court would ensure that
they were dealt with expeditiously. 60 Dissatisfaction with such injunctions
also arose from the political issues of the day, including concerns that
federal judges were too eager to interfere with state laws and to stymie the
badly-needed New Deal legislation at the federal level. 61 Three judges, it
was thought, were more likely to be measured and would provide “more
weight and greater deliberation.” 62
Although some members of the Court found the mechanism
burdensome, 63 as David Currie observed, by the early 1960s, the numbers
of such cases were modest:
[O]f an average total of 10,000 cases annually tried in the district
courts, a mere 60 are constitutional three-judge cases. And in a
recent five-year period during which nearly 2,000 cases were
filed in the Supreme Court each year, a total of 31 were direct
appeals from constitutional three-judge courts. 64
As already explained, however, by the 1970s, concern about the Court’s
caseload led Congress to expand discretionary jurisdiction and eliminate
the three-judge district court for many, but not all cases.
Even as it cut back on the use of three-judge courts, Congress,
deliberately and repeatedly preserved the mechanism for constitutional
58.
Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 238, 43 Stat. 936, 938; Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 155, §§ 2281–84, 62 Stat. 869, 969–69. The 1925 amendment was understood to apply
only in cases where a preliminary injunction was sought first. Currie, supra note 57, at 8
& n.47 (citing Smith v. Wilson, 273 U.S. 388 (1927)). In 1948, Congress extended the
mechanism to all cases seeking permanent injunctions of state statutes as unconstitutional.
Id. at 8–9.
59.
Act of August 24, 1937, ch. 754, § 3, 50 Stat. 751, 752.
60.
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, the Solicitor General, and the Path of
Reapportionment Litigation, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1109, 1137 (2012) [hereinafter
Solmine, Reapportionment].
61.
Currie, supra note 57, at 8, 10-11, 75.
62.
Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941). See also Ex parte
Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 567–69 (1928) (concluding that ordinances are not statutes requiring
a three-judge district court when challenged); Currie, supra note 57, at 31–34 (detailing
how the Court allowed single judges to hear cases involving statutes that were not of
statewide significance).
63.
Currie, supra note 57, at 11 (citing Phillips, 312 U.S. at 250).
64.
Id. at 11–12 (footnotes omitted). Nonetheless, Currie argued in favor of
eliminating the Supreme Court’s mandatory jurisdiction over appeals in these cases. Id. at
74–76.
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challenges to redistricting. Such challenges had only recently become
legally cognizable. In 1962, the Supreme Court entered the “political
thicket” and provided a judicial remedy for the severe malapportionment
that tended to keep state legislatures disproportionately rural and white. 65
It first decided Baker v. Carr, 66 followed two years later by Reynolds v.
Sims. 67 With these cases, the Court reversed its earlier conclusion in
Colegrove v. Green 68 that such questions were nonjusticiable, 69 albeit by
relying on a different clause of the Constitution than Colegrove had
considered. 70 Baker and Reynolds were deeply controversial, at least
initially, and even led some to propose stripping the federal courts of
jurisdiction in such cases altogether. 71 But the opinions quickly gained
widespread popular support, and within a remarkably short period of time,
legislative and congressional districts around the country were redrawn. 72
At first, Baker, Reynolds, and their progeny were brought in threejudge district courts because those courts were used for all cases seeking
injunctive relief against state laws. 73 By the time Congress began paring
back the types of cases heard by three-judge district courts, however,
reapportionment cases were understood to have a special status. In fact,
Congress went out of its way to protect these cases. In 1976, when it
eliminated the three-judge district court/mandatory jurisdiction procedure
for cases seeking to enjoin state laws, Congress retained the procedure for
redistricting cases, adding specific language to the statute. 74 The relevant
section reads: “A district court of three judges shall be convened when . .
. an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment
of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative
body.” 75 And this provision has not been amended or repealed since it was
added in 1976.
65.
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 267
(2009).
66.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
67.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
68.
328 U.S. 549 (1956).
69.
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 208–09.
70.
Colegrove held that Guarantee Clause challenges to redistricting were
nonjusticiable. See Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 552. Baker and Reynolds allowed such challenges
to proceed under the Equal Protection Clause. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 188; Reynolds, 377
U.S. at 568.
71.
Currie, supra note 57, at 5 & n.27; Solimine, Reapportionment, supra note
60, at 1110 & n.5.
72.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 65, at 269–70.
73.
Currie, supra note 57, at 12 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964)); Solimine,
Reapportionment, supra note 60, at 1137–38.
74.
Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified in part as
28 U.S.C. § 2284(a)).
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28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2012).
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Congress’s decision to retain the three-judge district court for
reapportionment cases was based on several years of consideration. As
early as 1971, as Congress began considering cutting back on such courts,
Senator Quentin Burdick proposed an amendment retaining them for
redistricting challenges. 76 A 1973 Senate Judiciary Committee report on
“Revision of the Jurisdiction of Three-Judge Courts” explained that such
reapportionment cases “are of such importance that they ought to be heard
by a three-judge court,” 77 a position echoed in a 1975 Senate report. 78
Judicial luminaries, such as Judges Skelly Wright and Henry Friendly,
strongly supported retaining the three-judge district court for such cases. 79
Ultimately, Congress enacted the entirely new statutory language quoted
above to maintain three-judge courts for reapportionment challenges. 80
This decision was not only deliberate; it was also controversial. Some
commentators and members of Congress expressly opposed keeping threejudge courts for redistricting cases. 81 And on the other side, the NAACP
opposed eliminating such courts at all with respect to challenges to state
laws, arguing that hostility to civil rights “tested the fortitude of a single
district judge from that community, and that the broader perspective of
three judges was necessary to give civil rights plaintiffs a fair hearing.”82
Leaving the procedure in place for reapportionment thus may have been a
compromise. And some members of Congress may not only have
considered reapportionment cases particularly important but also believed
that a three-judge court would be seen as less partisan. 83 Congress again
retained three-judge district courts for redistricting cases in the 1980s,
when it eliminated them in almost every other remaining context, 84
although by then partisan gerrymandering cases were beginning to be
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Id.
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See Three-Judge Court and Six-Person Jury: Hearing on S. 271 and H.R.
8285 Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 148–49 (1975) (statement of Clarence Mitchell,
Director, Washington Bureau, National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People) [hereinafter Testimony of Clarence Mitchell] (referencing also comments from
Rep. Drinian); Improvement of Judicial Machinery: Hearings on H.R. 6159 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 175–77 (1975) (Letter from Charles Alan Wright, McCormick
Professor of Law, to Rev. Robert F. Drinian, House of Representatives (Oct. 9, 1974)).
82.
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, and the Fate of the ThreeJudge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 143 (2008) [hereinafter Solimine, Ex Parte
Young]. See also Testimony of Clarence Mitchell, supra note 81.
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Id. at 143–45 & nn. 212–29 (discussing legislative history).
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See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–352, 102 Stat. 662.

2020:301

Docket Control

313

litigated. 85 Constitutional challenges to reapportionment thus have a
unique and congressionally recognized entitlement to special judicial
consideration.
This history is one of a number of reasons the Supreme Court was
wrong in Rucho, an opinion that has been justly and widely criticized. 86
But it is a reason that has not been well recognized. The history
demonstrates, however, that to the extent that some Justices believed that
the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction was a reason not to find partisan
gerrymandering claims justiciable, they had it exactly backwards. The
mandatory jurisdiction is both a sign of the significance that Congress has
placed on reapportionment litigation and a reminder that the Court does
not alone control its jurisdiction. 87
III. PROTECTING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE OR MASKING
POLITICIZATION?
The concerns expressed during oral argument in Rucho and Gill were
not limited to caseload size. As noted above, in Gill, Chief Justice Roberts
raised concerns about how political the Court would appear, and Paul
Clement echoed them during the Rucho argument. 88 This concern about
politicization is akin to, but distinct from, Coan’s discussions of judicial
independence, which he links to JCM.
Coan’s definition of judicial independence is “the capacity – or
inclination – of the judiciary to produce social change against the tide of
dominant political forces.” 89 He explains that this independence is limited
by judicial capacity because “[a]ny decision that constrains governmental
power increases the expected benefit of constitutional litigation. And any
decision that does so in the teeth of strongly held majority views is quite
likely to involve a high-stakes, if not a high-volume, domain in which the
Court feels compelled to grant review in a large fraction of cases.” 90 Here,
Coan offers JCM as reassurance, albeit not a panacea, to those concerned
about the countermajoritarian difficulty. At least in high-stakes/highvolume domains, he argues, the Court’s ability to thwart the will of the
majority is limited simply because it cannot handle the litigation that

85.
See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
86.
See, e.g., Article III – Justiciability – Political Question Doctrine – Rucho
v. Common Cause, 133 HARV. L. REV. 252 (2019).
87.
One need not embrace the three-judge district court/mandatory jurisdiction
procedure as a normative matter to believe that mandatory jurisdiction undermines the
Court’s holding in Rucho.
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See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–4, 35–36, Rucho v. Common Cause,
139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (No. 18-422)
89.
COAN, supra note 1, at 190.
90.
Id. at 192.
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would ensue if it were more aggressive. 91 Coan thus seems to hint at a
normative view of JCM as helping to protect majoritarian government.
Put another way, Coan’s model describes one mechanism by which
the Court and the people interact. Where most of the population maintains
a position at odds with the Court for any length of time, Coan suggests,
the Court will not be easily able to impose its views. 92 But the majority in
Rucho appeared afraid of public responses to hypothetical future rulings
not because those decisions would necessarily be countermajoritarian but
out of a desire to protect its claimed role as a neutral, non-political actor.
This desire was misplaced for numerous reasons, including that the
Rucho decision itself undermined democratic processes much more than it
protected them. 93 But Coan’s model offers one more. The techniques of
JCM demonstrate that the Court is not helpless in the face of political and
social pressures that manifest in litigation. It can calibrate. The all-ornothing political question ruling of Rucho simply ignored that reality and
cut off the possibility of dialogue between the Court and the public.
Moreover, the Court’s willingness to limit or preclude litigation in
some of the most fraught areas of constitutional law itself may be
politicized. It does not look like coincidence that the 5-4 Rucho decision
split on party lines; partisan gerrymandering has, of late, strongly favored
the Republican party. Partisan gerrymandering is also quite unpopular
with the American people, 94 but it can entrench dominant political forces
in power even if they do not command majority support. 95 And while
blocking constitutional challenges to partisan gerrymandering is itself
countermajoritarian, it shuts down any judicial dialogue with the people.
91.
Id. at 202–03.
92.
Cf. Carolyn Shapiro, Change Is the Only Constant: Unwritten Amendments
and the Courts (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author) (discussing the
“role of courts in developing and changing constitutional equilibria, as well as . . .
evaluating the merits of the equilibria”)
93.
See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, SCOTUS's Ruling on
Gerrymandering Endangers U.S. Democracy Time, TIME (July 11, 2019),
https://time.com/5623638/scotuss-ruling-on-gerrymandering-endangers-us-democracy/
[https://perma.cc/6GJ4-GB2V].
94.
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(Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchFOR JUST.
reports/americans-are-united-against-partisan-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/8CGXAE5S] (reporting on polls showing that a majority of Americans oppose partisan
gerrymandering); Elaine S. Povich, Gerrymandering Opponents Win Key Victories, PEW
STATELINE UPDATES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2018/11/07/gerrymandering-opponents-win-key-victories
[https://perma.cc/368K-62CG] (reporting on recent popular initiatives to end partisan
gerrymandering in three states).
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(Jan.
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2019),
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Contrast Rucho with two cases in the current Supreme Court Term.
In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 96 the Court
appeared poised to re-enter the pitched battles over gun regulation for the
first time since Heller 97 and McDonald. 98 Consistent with JCM, the Court
ultimately held, 6-3, that the issue before it was moot. 99
The second case involves abortion, and as of this writing, it is still
pending. The Court granted plenary review in June Medical Services, LLC
v. Gee 100 despite the fact that the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding severe
restrictions on abortion was so inconsistent with Hellerstedt v. Whole
Women’s Health 101 that summary reversal—which JCM would predict—
would have been appropriate. Yet the Court granted certiorari on the
substantive question about abortion restrictions. At the same time,
however, it agreed to decide whether to dramatically limit, or even
eliminate, abortion providers’ long-recognized standing to vindicate the
rights of their patients, making many, if not all, challenges to abortion
restrictions impossible to litigate.
Closing the courthouse door to hotly contested constitutional
questions may be consistent with JCM, but the tools of JCM can
themselves be manipulated for political or ideological reasons, as these
cases demonstrate. Overruling well-established third-party standing
principles to close the courthouse door to most challenges to abortion
restrictions only one Term after finding partisan gerrymandering entirely
nonjusticiable by a 5-4 ideologically split vote would be seen as such
manipulation by many. Similarly, Justice Alito dissented in New York
State Rifle, hinting that the Court was manipulating mootness doctrine to
avoid deciding a controversial issue that he believes is long overdue for
the Court’s attention. 102 In other words, JCM can undermine the very
independence, or appearance thereof, that the Court is trying to maintain.
A purely descriptive account of JCM fails to capture this complexity.
CONCLUSION
In Rationing the Constitution, Coan avoids normative judgments, and
he describes a phenomenon that may be, at least in part, inevitable. But his
96.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S.
Ct. 1525 (2020) (per curiam).
97.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
98.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
99.
New York State Rifle, 140 S. Ct. at 1526-27.
100.
905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018).
101.
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
102.
140 S. Ct. at 1527 (Alito, J., dissenting). Unlike the nonjusticiability holding
in Rucho, however, the mootness holding in New York State Rifle, applied only to a single
issue, as presented to the Court in the particular case, and does not preclude the future
development of Second Amendment law.
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keen observations invite critical reflection by commentators and by the
Court itself. Caseload management cannot justify ignoring congressional
determinations that certain types of cases are entitled to special judicial
consideration. Congress has made clear that constitutional challenges to
reapportionment are entitled to such special judicial examination. The
Court in Rucho abandoned that mandate. And as Rucho itself
demonstrates, JCM is, or at least can be, just as politically or ideologically
freighted as anything else the Court does. Coan opens a new avenue of
inquiry, but as with so much high-quality scholarship, it raises at least as
many questions as it answers.

